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INTRODUCTION 
n May 5, 2016, the Oregon Supreme Court issued its decision in 
Horton v. Oregon Health & Science University.1 In Horton, the 
court reinterpreted the Oregon Constitution’s remedy clause of article 
I, section 10, and its provisions on the right to jury trial, article I, 
section 17, and article VII (amended), section 3.2 After a 
comprehensive review of the text and history of those provisions, the 
court overruled earlier decisions interpreting those provisions and 
 
* Susan Marmaduke is a shareholder in the Portland office of Harrang Long Gary 
Rudnick PC. Her practice emphasizes business litigation and appeals. She received her 
J.D. from Berkeley Law (Boalt Hall) in 1977 and is admitted to practice in Oregon, 
California, and Washington. 
1 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
2 Id. at 168, 376 P.3d at 998. 
O 
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changed the way courts evaluate the constitutionality of legislative 
enactments, including statutory limits on damages. 
The Horton decision, its meaning, and its significance for statutes 
that eliminate causes of action or curtail the recoverable damages for 
various torts have been the subject of much debate and litigation. The 
Oregon Court of Appeals recently issued several decisions applying 
Horton, at least some of which may be reviewed by the Oregon 
Supreme Court.3 
In Horton, the seven-member Oregon Supreme Court was divided 
in its interpretation of the remedy clause and the jury trial provisions 
of the Oregon Constitution. Justice Kistler wrote the opinion for the 
majority, joined by Justice Brewer, Chief Justice Balmer, and Senior 
Justice pro tempore Linder; Justice Landau concurred. Justices 
Walters and Baldwin dissented. 
Since May 5, 2016, the membership of the Oregon Supreme Court 
has changed in ways that may presage further reinterpretation of the 
remedy clause and the jury trial provisions. Only two members of the 
Horton majority remain, Justice Kistler and Chief Justice Balmer. 
Justices Brewer, Linder, and Landau have retired from the court, as 
has one of the two dissenters, Justice Baldwin. They have been 
replaced by Justices Nakamoto, Flynn, Duncan, and Nelson. Justice 
Walters has been an outspoken critic of the Horton majority’s views, 
particularly regarding the jury trial provisions. If the court changes 
course, it is likely to do so under the intellectual leadership of Justice 
Walters. For that reason, the views Justice Walters expressed in her 
dissenting opinion in Horton deserve close attention. What follows is 
a discussion of the Horton court’s analysis of the remedy clause and 
the jury trial provisions from the perspectives of the majority and the 
dissent. 
 
3 See e.g., Vasquez v. Double Press Mfg., Inc., 288 Or. App. 503, 406 P.3d 225 (Or. 
App. 2017) (holding that the $500,000 noneconomic damages cap under ORS 31.710(1) 
violates the remedy clause when applied to a jury verdict of $6,199,090.20, of which 
$4,860,000 are noneconomic damages); Schutz v. La Costita III, Inc., 288 Or. App. 476, 
406 P.3d 66 (Or. App. 2017) (holding that ORS 471.565(1), eliminating claims against 
servers of alcohol to a person who is injured by his or her own voluntary consumption of 
alcohol, violates the remedy clause); Rains v. Stayton Builders Mart, Inc., 289 Or. App. 
672,—P.3d—(Or. App. 2018) (holding that the $500,000 noneconomic damages cap under 
ORS 31.710(1) violates the remedy clause when applied to an injured construction 
worker’s jury award of $2,343,750 in noneconomic damages and when applied to the 
spouse’s jury award of $759,375 in noneconomic damages for loss of consortium). 
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I 
THE REMEDY CLAUSE OF ARTICLE I, SECTION 10 
In 1857, the Oregon Constitutional Convention adopted the Bill of 
Rights of the Oregon Constitution, including article I, section 10. That 
provision states: 
No court shall be secret, but justice shall be administered, openly 
and without purchase, completely and without delay, and every man 
shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done him in his 
person, property, or reputation.4 
As the Horton court recognized, each of the three independent 
clauses that comprise article I, section 10, addresses the 
administration of justice.5 The first prohibits secret courts. The second 
provides that justice shall be administered “openly and without 
purchase, completely and without delay.” The third provides that 
“every man shall have remedy by due course of law for injury done 
him in his person, property, or reputation.” It is the meaning of that 
third clause, the so-called “remedy clause,” that has proved to be the 
great enigma. 
The Oregon Supreme Court has interpreted the remedy clause in a 
variety of ways over the decades since it was written in 1857. The 
result has been a body of case law that, as former Justice Landau put 
it, “lacks anything resembling doctrinal coherence.”6 The Horton 
court grappled with that body of case law and tried to identify some 
unifying themes. But the cases cannot be reconciled because they 
represent two fundamentally inconsistent views of what the remedy 
clause prescribes for the roles of the legislature and of the courts with 
respect to the law of torts. 
On one hand, the remedy clause can be read to mean that every 
person shall have access to the courts to find remedy for such 
substantive rights as the law may recognize at that time. Under that 
view, the authority to create, eliminate, or modify substantive claims 
resides with the legislature, subject only to review by the courts for 
violation of other constitutional provisions. The role of the courts is to 
serve as an open, effective, and impartial forum to which all persons, 
regardless of their station in life, have access for the purpose of 
vindicating such substantive rights as the law may provide at that 
 
4 OR. CONST. art. I, § 10. 
5 Horton, 359 Or. at 179, 376 P.3d at 1006. 
6 Id. at 255, 376 P.3d at 1047 (Landau, J., concurring). 
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time. That view is consistent with the provision’s ancient historical 
roots. The Horton majority analyzed its English antecedents, 
including Lord Coke’s discussion of this textually resonant part of 
Magna Carta: 
 And therefore, every subject of this realme [sic], for injury done 
to him in bonis [goods], terres [lands], vel persona [or in person], 
by any other be he eccleasiasticall [sic], or temporall [sic], free, or 
bond, man, or woman, old, or young, or be he outlawed, 
excommunicated, or any other without exception, may take his 
remedy by the course of the law, and have justice, and right for the 
injury done to him, freely without sale, fully without any denial, and 
speedily without delay.7 
The Horton majority observed that the goal of that ancient 
provision was to prevent royal interference with the common law 
courts, not to limit parliament’s authority to alter the substantive law.8 
At times, the Oregon Supreme Court has adopted a similar 
interpretation of article I, section 10.9 
On the other hand, the remedy clause can be read as limiting the 
legislature’s authority to determine substantive rights and remedies, 
including its authority to limit the type or amount of damages that 
may be recovered. Under that view, the remedy clause gives the 
courts authority to second-guess the legislature’s policy judgments as 
to what claims are actionable and the types and amounts of 
recoverable damages for those claims, and to evaluate whether, in the 
court’s view, the resulting legislation departs too radically from the 
common law in light of the legislature’s purposes in enacting it, or 
results in the recovery of damages that the court regards as too low. 
In Horton, the plaintiff’s son suffered personal injuries as a result 
of medical negligence.10 The court held that the remedy clause was 
not violated when the trial court reduced a verdict for economic 
damages of $6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages of $6,000,000 
to a total of $3,000,000 based on the Oregon Tort Claims Act.11 In 
explaining its holding, the Horton court adopted the latter view of the 
 
7 Id. at 200, 376 P.3d at 1017 (quoting 1 EDWARD COKE, THE SECOND PART OF THE 
INSTITUTES OF THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 55 (W. Clarke & Sons 1809)). 
8 Id. at 20102, 376 P.3d at 1017–18. 
9 See, e.g., Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Or. 330, 40 P.2d 1009 (1935) (holding that article I, 
section 10, does not deny the legislature the authority to enact a guest passenger statute 
eliminating a guest’s right to bring a claim for personal injuries caused by the driver’s 
simple negligence). 
10 Horton, 359 Or. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1001–02. 
11 Id. 
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remedy clause. Only Justice Landau, in his concurring opinion, took 
the view that the remedy clause “protects against executive and 
legislative interference with judicial independence and access to the 
courts, but does not impose a limitation on the otherwise plenary 
authority of the legislature to determine rights and remedies.”12 The 
majority and the dissent concluded that the remedy clause imposes 
substantive limits on the legislature’s authority to alter or eliminate 
claims and to limit the types and amounts of recoverable damages, but 
disagreed on what those limits are and left unanswered many 
questions about how those limits are to be determined. 
Because the Horton majority expressly overruled only one of the 
often contradictory cases that comprise the Oregon Supreme Court’s 
body of work on the remedy clause, Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, 
Inc.,13 some familiarity with the court’s pre-Horton remedy clause 
cases is necessary in order to understand Horton. The following 
survey is not exhaustive, but provides some of the main landmarks 
along the court’s way from 1857 to the 2016 Horton decision. 
II 
OREGON REMEDY CLAUSE CASES BEFORE HORTON 
As the Horton majority explained in some detail, a number of the 
early remedy clause cases involved persons who were injured by 
defects in city streets.14 Generally, the cases adhered to the principle 
first announced in Mattson v. Astoria,15 that, as long as legislation left 
the injured person with a cause of action against either the city or a 
city employee, it did not violate article I, section 10.16 In West v. 
Jaloff,17 the court considered whether to construe a statute as 
immunizing drivers of emergency vehicles from liability for simple 
negligence in certain circumstances. Rejecting that construction, the 
court cited the “settled law of this state that the common-law remedy 
for negligently inflicted injuries cannot be taken away without 
providing some other efficient remedy in its place.”18 
 
12 Id. at 286, 376 P.3d at 1064 (Landau, J., concurring). 
13 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001), overruled by 
Horton, 359 Or. at 188, 376 P.3d at 1010. 
14 See, e.g., Horton, 359 Or. at 189–90, 376 P.3d at 1011–12 (citing several examples). 
15 Mattson v. City of Astoria, 39 Or. 577, 65 P. 1066 (1901). 
16 Horton, 359 Or. at 190, 376 P.3d at 1012. 
17 West v. Jaloff, 113 Or. 184, 232 P. 642 (1925). 
18 Id. at 195, 232 P. at 645. 
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But in Perozzi v. Ganiere, the court held that article I, section 10, 
does not deny the legislature the authority to enact a statute 
eliminating a guest passenger’s cause of action for personal injury 
caused by the driver’s simple negligence.19 The court observed that, 
in West v. Jaloff, the evidence failed to show that the defendant’s 
ambulance was within the coverage of the challenged statute.20 More 
fundamentally, the court stated that “[t]he right to alter all laws in 
force in the territory of Oregon when the constitution was adopted, 
whether the same were of common-law or legislative origin, was 
reserved to the people of the state by article 18, [section] 7.”21 The 
court commented, 
Moreover, had it been the intention of the framers of the 
Constitution to adopt and preserve the remedy for all injuries 
to person or property which the common law afforded, they 
undoubtedly would have signified that intention by exact and 
specific wording, rather than the language used in article 1, 
[section] 10.22 
In Sealey v. Hicks, the court again concluded that the remedy 
clause does not prohibit the legislature from eliminating a common 
law claim, so long as it acts for a legitimate legislative purpose.23 The 
plaintiff was injured when the roof of the vehicle in which he was 
riding came off during a rollover.24 His claim was barred by the 
statute of repose applicable to product liability claims, ORS 
30.905(1), because the accident occurred more than eight years after 
the vehicle was originally sold.25 On appeal, the plaintiff contended 
that the statute of repose violated the remedy clause by denying him a 
cause of action for what would otherwise be a legally cognizable 
injury.26 
The Sealey court disagreed. It expressed the view that, as long as 
the legislature acted for “legitimate legislative purposes”—that is, 
“for the purpose of protecting a recognized public interest”—then the 
court will not inquire into the reasonableness or efficacy of the 
legislature’s enactment in accomplishing that purpose.27 As for 
 
19 Perozzi v. Ganiere, 149 Or. 330, 350, 40 P.2d 1009, 1016 (1935). 
20 Id. at 343, 40 P.2d at 1014. 
21 Id. at 346, 40 P.2d at 1015. 
22 Id. 
23 Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387, 788 P.2d 435 (1990). 
24 Id. at 390, 788 P.2d at 436. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. at 393, 788 P.2d at 438. 
27 Id. at 394, 788 P.2d at 438–39 (citation omitted). 
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statutes of repose, the court concluded that “[i]t is a permissible 
constitutional legislative function to balance the possibility of 
outlawing legitimate claims against the public need that at some 
definite time there be an end to potential litigation.”28 In short, the 
law did not violate the plaintiff’s rights under the remedy clause 
because “[t]he legislature has the authority to determine what 
constitutes a legally cognizable injury.”29 
Particularly significant was the Sealey court’s rejection of the 
plaintiff’s invitation to evaluate the reasonableness and efficacy of the 
statute in accomplishing its legislative purpose. The plaintiff relied on 
a case in which the Supreme Court of New Hampshire struck down a 
statute of repose under its constitution’s remedy clause.30 Applying 
that clause, the New Hampshire court concluded that the twelve-year 
statute of repose was unreasonable because it could deprive persons 
of a remedy before their claim accrued and was, “in that court’s view, 
unrelated to the underlying purpose of holding down insurance rates, 
primarily because ‘the crisis in products liability insurance had abated 
nationwide independent of [this law].’”31 A report by a New 
Hampshire Legislative Commission to Study Product Injury 
Reparations supported the court’s conclusion.32 
The Sealey court rejected that approach, stating, “[s]uch statements 
reflect a fundamental difference between the powers and duties of the 
Supreme Court of New Hampshire and of this court . . . . We are not 
empowered to strike down a duly enacted law simply because we 
believe it is unwise, unnecessary, or unsuccessful.”33 The Sealey 
court understood the legislature to have the authority to decide the 
injuries for which a plaintiff may state a claim, and it understood the 
judiciary not to have the authority to strike down a legitimate exercise 
of that authority on policy grounds. 
The court has upheld the application of statutory caps on damages 
several times. For example, in Hale v. Port of Portland,34 the court 
upheld a tort claims damage limit of $100,000 on a claim against the 
 
28 Id. (citation omitted). 
29 Id. at 394, 788 P.2d at 439. 
30 Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288 (1983). 
31 Sealey, 309 Or. at 395–96, 788 P.2d at 439 (alteration in original). 
32 Id. at 396 n.10, 788 P.2d at 439 n.10. 
33 Id. at 396, 788 P.2d at 439. 
34 Hale v. Port of Portland, 308 Or. 508, 783 P.2d 506 (1989), abrogated by Smothers 
v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001). 
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City of Portland, even though the plaintiff’s claim would have been 
unlimited at common law because the city was acting in a proprietary 
capacity, and even though the plaintiff’s alleged economic damages 
exceeded $600,000.35 The court invoked the principle that article I, 
section 10, is not violated “when the legislature alters (or even 
abolishes) a cause of action, so long as the party injured is not left 
entirely without a remedy. Under those cases, the remedy need not be 
precisely of the same type or extent; it is enough that the remedy is a 
substantial one.”36 
In 2001, the court decided Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc.37 
and gave article I, section 10, precisely the interpretation that the 
Perozzi court found so implausible based on its text. The Smothers 
court expressly abrogated Sealey, stating, “[w]e disavow the holding 
in Sealey that the legislature constitutionally is authorized to define 
what constitutes an injury to absolute rights respecting person, 
property, and reputation that are protected by Article I, section 10.”38 
While the Smothers court took that power away from the 
legislature, it did not vest it solely in itself. Instead, the Smothers 
court attempted to establish an alternate point of reference outside of 
itself by which the constitutionality of legislation should be measured: 
the common law at the time the Oregon Constitution was adopted. As 
Justice Landau put it, “Smothers, for all its faults, at least supplied a 
point of reference in defining the constitutionally irreducible 
minimum of rights in terms of common-law claims that existed at the 
time of the state’s founding.”39 
In Smothers, the plaintiff alleged that his employer negligently 
exposed him to dangerous fumes that were a contributing cause of his 
injuries.40 The workers’ compensation law required injured workers 
to prove that their employer’s negligence was the major contributing 
cause of their injury; the plaintiff in Smothers could not make that 
 
35 Id. at 526, 783 P.2d at 516. 
36 Id. at 523, 783 P.2d at 514; see also Greist v. Phillips, 322 Or. 281, 291, 906 P.2d 
789, 795 (1995) (holding that “100 percent of economic damages plus up to $500,000 in 
[capped] noneconomic damages is a substantial amount, but also because the statutory 
wrongful death action in Oregon has had a low limit on recovery for 133 years of its 133-
year history”). 
37 Smothers v. Gresham Transfer, Inc., 332 Or. 83, 23 P.3d 333 (2001), overruled by 
Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
38 Id. at 123, 23 P.3d at 356 (2001). 
39 Horton, 359 Or. at 284, 376 P.3d at 1062 (Landau, J., concurring). 
40 Smothers, 332 Or. at 126, 23 P.3d at 357. 
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more onerous showing.41 Unable to obtain compensation under the 
workers’ compensation law, the plaintiff then filed a negligence claim 
against his employer.42 The trial court dismissed his claim on the 
basis of a 1995 amendment to the workers’ compensation law that 
made workers’ compensation benefits the exclusive remedy for work-
related injuries.43 The court of appeals affirmed that result, relying on 
earlier remedy clause decisions by the Oregon Supreme Court.44 
The Oregon Supreme Court reversed, holding that “[h]aving 
alleged an injury of the kind that the remedy clause protects, and 
having demonstrated that there was no remedial process available 
under present workers’ compensation laws, plaintiff should have been 
allowed to proceed with his negligence action.”45 The court based that 
holding on its conclusion that the meaning of the remedy clause is 
tied to Oregon’s common law in 1857, when the Oregon Constitution 
was adopted.46 The court concluded that the remedy clause protects 
the availability of a cause of action for any injury to “absolute” rights 
respecting person, property, and reputation that was available at 
common law when the Oregon Constitution was drafted in 1857.47 If 
the common law in 1857 provided a cause of action for a particular 
injury to person, property, or reputation, then the law must continue to 
provide a cause of action for that historically defined injury. In so 
holding, the court abrogated Perozzi and Sealey, among other 
previous decisions.48 
In 2007, a unanimous Oregon Supreme Court decided Clarke v. 
Oregon Health Sciences University.49 In Clarke, the court held that 
the Oregon Tort Claims Act’s (OTCA) statutory damages cap 
($200,000 at the time) was unconstitutional as applied. The court 
started with the Smothers analysis to decide whether the common law 
 
41 Id. at 133–35, 23 P.3d at 361–62 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 656.802(2)(a) (2017)). 
42 Id. at 126, 23 P.3d at 357. 
43 Id., at 127, 23 P.3d at 357–58. 
44 Id. at 127, 23 P.3d at 358. 
45 Id. at 136, 23 P.3d at 362. 
46 See id. at 114, 23 P.3d at 351. 
47 See id. 
48 See id. at 118–23, 23 P.3d at 353–56. See generally Noonan v. City of Portland, 161 
Or. 213, 249, 88 P.2d 808, 822 (1938) (“Article I, §10, Oregon Constitution, was not 
intended to give anyone a vested right in the law either statutory or common; nor was it 
intended to render the law static.”); and all other cases recognizing that the Oregon 
Constitution authorizes the legislature to define legally cognizable injuries, including 
injuries to person, property, or reputation. 
49 Clarke v. Or. Health Scis. Univ., 343 Or. 581, 175 P.3d 418 (2007). 
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would have recognized the plaintiff’s negligence claim against 
Oregon Health & Science University (OHSU).50 The court 
determined that OHSU was an instrumentality of the state and 
therefore would have been immune from liability under the common 
law in 1857.51 Thus, the court concluded that application of the 
OTCA’s damages limitation to the plaintiff’s negligence claim against 
OHSU does not violate article I, section 10.52 The court proceeded to 
conclude that the plaintiff would have had a negligence claim against 
OHSU’s employees in 1857, but the OTCA eliminated any cause of 
action against OHSU’s employees or agents.53 Instead, the OTCA 
provided a substitute cause of action against OHSU with damages 
capped at $200,000.54 The court concluded that the damages cap 
violated the remedy clause because that amount was paltry in 
comparison to the plaintiff’s damages.55 The court stated: 
 Article I, section 10, does not eliminate the power of the 
legislature to vary and modify both the form and the measure of 
recovery for an injury, as long as it does not leave the injured party 
with an “emasculated” version of the remedy that was available at 
common law.56 
The parties in Clarke stipulated that the plaintiff’s economic 
damages were $12,273,506 and his noneconomic damages were $5 
million.57 The court concluded that the OTCA’s $200,000 damages 
limit, as applied to the plaintiff, was unconstitutionally inadequate.58 
Chief Justice Balmer wrote a dissent, joined by Justice Kistler, 
advising the legislature to increase the amount of the OTCA damages 
limit.59 He wrote, in part, “the fact that virtually every Oregon doctor 
carries malpractice insurance that far exceeds the caps applicable to 
OHSU and its employees suggests that those limits need to be 
changed.”60The legislature subsequently took Chief Justice Balmer’s 
advice and increased the OTCA damages cap. 
 
50 Id. at 593, 175 P.3d at 425. 
51 Id. at 600, 175 P.3d at 428. 
52 Id. at 600, 175 P.3d at 428–29. 
53 See Id. at 608, 175 P.3d at 433. 
54 Id. 
55 Id. at 610, 175 P.3d at 434. 
56 Id. at 606, 175 P.3d at 432. 
57 Id. at 608, 175 P.3d at 433. 
58 Id. at 609–10, 175 P.3d at 434. 
59 Clarke, 343 Or. at 610–17, 175 P.3d at 434–38 (Balmer, C.J., dissenting). 
60 Id. at 612, 175 P.3d at 435 (Balmer, C.J., dissenting). 
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The Clarke court was particularly concerned about the effect of the 
OTCA’s cap on the plaintiff’s ability to recover his economic 
damages. In Greist v. Phillips, the court rejected an article I, section 
10, challenge to the damages cap in former 18.560, renumbered as 
ORS 31.710 (2003), on the ground that the capped amount of 
$500,000 in noneconomic damages, plus an uncapped award of 
$100,000, was a constitutionally adequate substitute remedy.  The 
Clarke court explained Greist by emphasizing that—unlike the 
OTCA’s statutory limit on all damages—the statutory cap in Greist 
placed no limit on economic damages: 
[T]he statutory damage limitation at issue in Greist allowed 
recovery of 100 percent of any economic damages and up to 
$500,000 in noneconomic damages. Placing no limit on recovery of 
economic damages allowed plaintiffs to recover fully their out-of-
pocket losses, including expenses for medical, burial, and memorial 
services.61 
In State v. Rodriguez, the court explained its ruling in Clarke by 
again emphasizing the effect of the OTCA on the plaintiff’s recovery 
of his economic damages: 
 Clarke . . . illustrate[s] the specific, limited circumstances in 
which we may conclude that a statute that is constitutional on its 
face nevertheless may be unconstitutional as applied to particular 
facts. In Clarke, we recognized that a legislatively imposed limit on 
injury claims against the state did not, on its face, violate Article I, 
section 10. However, considering the facts of that case, where the 
plaintiff’s actual damages exceeded $11 million, and the legislature 
imposed a cap of $200,000, we held that application of the 
legislative cap to that plaintiff was unconstitutional.62 
Then, in 2013, the court decided Howell v. Boyle.63 The OTCA’s  
$200,000 cap still applied in Howell, but the court held that it did not 
violate the remedy clause when applied to a plaintiff who sustained 
$507,000 in total damages.64 This precipitated a rush among lawyers 
to try to determine what ratio the court would deem “substantial” and 
whether economic damages are on a different footing than 
noneconomic damages for purposes of evaluating the constitutional 
sufficiency of a statutorily capped damages award. 
 
61 Id. at 609, 175 P.3d at 434 (citation omitted). 
62 State v. Rodriguez, 347 Or. 46, 80, 217 P.3d 659, 680 (2009) (citations omitted). 
63 Howell v. Boyle, 353 Or. 359, 298 P.3d 1 (2013). 
64 Id. at 388, 298 P.3d at 17. 
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III 
THE REMEDY CLAUSE ACCORDING TO THE HORTON MAJORITY 
In Horton v. Oregon Health & Science University,65 the plaintiff’s 
son suffered personal injuries as a result of negligence by OHSU and 
a doctor at OHSU.66 The jury awarded economic damages of 
$6,071,190.38 and noneconomic damages of $6,000,000. 67 By that 
time, the OTCA’s cap on all damages was $3,000,000, and the trial 
judge reduced the verdict to that amount.68 The Oregon Supreme 
Court held that application of the OTCA’s damages limit did not 
violate the remedy clause.69 While Horton is a scholarly tour de 
force, it did not eliminate the confusion that has marked the court’s 
remedy clause cases. 
In grappling with the remedy clause, the Horton court was united 
with respect to one point: whatever the remedy clause means, its 
meaning “is not tied to its meaning in 1857.”70 Thus, the court 
overruled Smothers.71 But exactly what the remedy clause does mean 
is less clear. By expressly overruling only Smothers and reaffirming 
the remedy clause cases that preceded it (many of which were 
contradictory), the Horton court left unanswered a host of questions 
about the clause’s meaning. The court extended the fog of uncertainty 
to the remedy clause cases that came after Smothers, as well. The 
court stated only that, to the extent those cases relied on the part of 
Smothers’ reasoning that Horton disavowed, “those cases must be 
taken with a grain of salt.”72 
The result is that the bench and bar are left to wonder—and litigate 
over—the extent to which the competing interpretations announced in 
the court’s earlier remedy clause decisions remain viable. Just what 
does the remedy clause prohibit the legislature from doing? The 
Horton majority’s response was essentially a well-researched and 
thoughtful version of, “It’s complicated.” 
 
65 Horton v. Or. Health & Sci. Univ., 359 Or. 168, 376 P.3d 998 (2016). 
66 Id. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1001–02. 
67 Id. 
68 Id. at 171, 376 P.3d at 1002. 
69 Id. at 221, 376 P.3d at 1028. 
70 See id. at 187, 288, 376 P.3d at 1016, 1064 (Kistler, J., for the majority and Walters, 
J., for the dissent). 
71 Id. at 177–78, 376 P.3d at 1005. 
72 Id. at 220, 376 P.3d at 1028. 
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The Horton majority began by scrutinizing the text, but concluded 
that it “does not provide a clear answer as to the clause’s meaning.”73 
Without a clear answer from the text, the Horton majority proceeded 
to conduct a comprehensive review of the remedy clause’s historical 
antecedents,74 but concluded that the historical sources also “[did] not 
yield a clear answer regarding the clause’s meaning.”75 On the one 
hand, the remedy clause’s English antecedents were intended to 
prevent royal interference with the common law courts, not to limit 
parliament’s authority to alter the substantive law.76 On the other 
hand, the decisions from other states that preceded the adoption of 
Oregon’s Constitution “consistently viewed their state remedy clauses 
as placing some substantive limit on legislative authority,”77 although 
the nature of those limits varied widely. Some viewed their remedy 
clauses as “prohibitions on retroactive legislation,” and others as 
permitting the legislature to “substitute a less-protective remedy for 
the common-law one”78or prohibiting “a complete denial of a 
common-law remedy.”79 
Faced with conflicting information about the meaning of the 
remedy clause, the Horton majority decided it could not conclude that 
the court’s previous interpretations were clearly wrong: 
 Given the cases that preceded and were contemporaneous with 
the adoption of Oregon’s remedy clause cases, we cannot say that 
our decisions, with the exception of Smothers, find no support in the 
text and history of that provision and should be overruled. In 
reaching that conclusion, we need not decide how we would 
interpret Oregon’s remedy clause if we were considering it for the 
first time. Rather, for over 100 years, this court has debated the 
meaning of the clause, the latitude it gives the legislature, and the 
rights it protects . . . . We may not toss that considered body of 
decisions aside . . . . Although we overrule Smothers, we reaffirm 
our remedy clause decisions that preceded Smothers, including the 
cases that Smothers disavowed.80 
The majority concluded that the remedy clause does impose limits 
on the legislature’s authority to curtail or eliminate common law 
 
73 Id. at 198, 376 P.3d at 1016. 
74 See id. at 198–218, 376 P.3d at 1016–27. 
75 Id. at 217, 376 P.3d at 1026. 
76 Id. at 20102, 376 P.3d at 1017–18. 
77 Id. at 217, 376 P.3d at 1026. 
78 Id. at 21718, 376 P.3d at 1026. 
79 Id. at 218, 376 P.3d at 1026. 
80 Id. at 218, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
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claims and the amount and types of damages recoverable for those 
claims. In deciding whether legislation violates the remedy clause, 
“we must consider the extent to which the legislature has departed 
from the common-law model measured against its reason for doing 
so.”81 The court explained: 
 It is difficult to reduce [the answer] to a simple formula, as 
Smothers sought to do, in part because the statutes that have given 
rise to [our prior] decisions do not reflect a single legislative goal or 
method of achieving that goal . . . . Attempts to articulate a single 
unifying principle fail to comprehend the varied ways that the 
legislature can and has gone about achieving its goals.82 
Instead, the court sought to draw a collection of underlying 
principles from the disparate body of remedy clause cases. The court 
began its summary of those underlying principles with this: “First, 
when the legislature has not altered a duty but has denied a person 
injured as a result of a breach of that duty any remedy, our cases have 
held that the complete denial of a remedy violates the remedy 
clause.”83 
But, the court observed that, in some cases: 
 [T]he legislature has modified common-law duties and, on 
occasion, has eliminated common-law causes of action when the 
premises underlying those duties and causes of action have 
changed. In those instances, what has mattered in determining the 
constitutionality of the legislature’s action is the reason for the 
legislative change measured against the extent to which the 
legislature has departed from the common law. That is, we have 
considered, among other things, whether the common-law cause of 
action that was modified continues to protect core interests against 
injury to persons, property, or reputation or whether, in light of 
changed conditions, the legislature permissibly could conclude that 
those interests no longer require the protection formerly afforded 
them.84 
 
81 Id. at 220, 376 P.3d at 1028. 
82 Id. 
83 Id. at 219, 376 P.3d at 1027. While that statement is, of course, correct, it is 
noteworthy that the Horton majority did not only disavow Smothers’ analytical approach, 
but expressly overruled Smothers’ holding that the Workers’ Compensation Law’s denial 
of any remedy to a worker injured by his employer’s negligence violates the remedy 
clause. Specifically, the Horton majority said, “[b]ecause we overrule Smothers, it follows 
that its conclusion—that the workers’ compensation statute was unconstitutional as 
applied—cannot stand. We express no opinion on whether our remedy clause cases that 
preceded Smothers, which we reaffirm today, would lead to the same conclusion.” Id. at 
188 n.9, 376 P.3d at 1010 n.9. 
84 Id. at 21920, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
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To ask whether times have changed such that certain interests are 
no longer important enough to require legal protection is to engage in 
an essentially legislative judgment. And, if the court decides that we 
still have a “core interest” in, for example, protecting against personal 
injury, would the court now decide that a guest passenger statute, as 
in Perozzi, violates the remedy clause? What about a statute of 
ultimate repose that has the effect, as in Sealey, of denying an injured 
person any opportunity to bring a claim? Is the determination as to 
whether a common law cause of action “continues to protect core 
interests” properly within the province of the courts or the legislature? 
The Horton majority was careful to limit its decision to the facts 
before it.85 Still, Horton seems to suggest that such quintessentially 
policy-driven questions are ultimately within the province of the 
courts, not the legislature, to decide. 
The Horton majority also observed that: 
 the court has recognized that the reasons for the legislature’s 
actions can matter. For example, when the legislature has sought to 
adjust a person’s rights and remedies as part of a larger statutory 
scheme that extends benefits to some while limiting benefits to 
others, we have considered that quid pro quo in determining 
whether the reduced benefit that the legislature has provided an 
individual plaintiff is “substantial” in light of the overall statutory 
scheme.86 
Again, those are distinctly questions of policy. In Sealey, the court 
viewed its role as a limited one: the court focused on whether the 
legislature acted with a legitimate legislative purpose.87 Once the 
court answered that legal question in the affirmative, the court 
refrained from second-guessing the wisdom or efficacy of the 
legislative action or weighing the inevitable trade-offs attendant upon 
virtually all such actions. To engage in balancing a law’s negative 
effects on an individual’s rights against its other positive effects may 
not be so much a question of constitutional validity, but instead a 
question of whether the law is a good idea. The Horton court 
recognized simply that “the reasons for the legislature’s actions can 
matter.”88 But one wonders how far the court will wander beyond that 
inquiry—where it will draw the line between the exercise of judicial 
 
85 Id. at 225, 376 P.3d at 1030. 
86 Id. at 219, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
87 Sealey v. Hicks, 309 Or. 387, 395, 788 P.2d 435, 439 (1990). 
88 Horton, 359 Or. at 219, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
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and legislative powers—after Horton. While the legislature may not 
be limited in the same historically fixed manner that it had been under 
Smothers, the remedy clause under Horton continues to limit the 
legislature’s authority to determine substantive rights—except to the 
extent the court may agree with the legislature’s policy choices 
The Horton court observed, “our cases have held that providing an 
insubstantial remedy for a breach of a recognized duty also violates 
the remedy clause.”89 That observation invites this question: If the 
remedy clause permits the legislature to eliminate a cause of action 
entirely, why does it not authorize the legislature to preserve the cause 
of action, but limit the recoverable damages? 
The Horton leaves many questions unresolved. The Horton 
majority concluded its remedy clause analysis this way: 
 Our holding today is limited to the circumstances that this case 
presents, and it turns on the presence of the state’s constitutionally 
recognized interest in sovereign immunity, the quid pro quo that the 
Tort Claims Act provides, and the tort claims limits in this case. We 
express no opinion on whether other types of damages caps, which 
do not implicate the state’s constitutionally recognized interest in 
sovereign immunity and which are not part of a similar quid pro 
quo, comply with article I, section 10. Those cases are not before 
us, and we leave their resolution to the customary process of case-
by-case adjudication.90 
IV 
THE REMEDY CLAUSE ACCORDING TO THE HORTON DISSENT 
The dissent agreed with the majority that “the meaning of the 
remedy clause is not tied to its meaning in 1857.”91 The dissent 
disavowed Smothers to the extent that decision has been understood 
to require a court to 
ascertain the damages that the plaintiff would have received at 
common law [and] then compare those damages to the damages that 
the plaintiff received at trial. If the plaintiff would have received 
less at common law than the plaintiff received at trial, then . . . 
capped damages can be considered “fully restorative” of a common-
law negligence claim.92 
The dissent observed, however, that Smothers did not involve a 
damages cap. Therefore, the dissent commented, “the majority should 
 
89 Id. at 219, 376 P.3d at 1027. 
90 Id. at 225, 376 P.3d at 1030. 
91 Id. at 288, 376 P.3d at 1064 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
92 Id. at 288, 376 P.3d at 1065 (Walters, J., dissenting).  
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have used Clarke to resolve this case.”93 Clarke was decided by a 
unanimous court that included Justice Walters. But Justice Walters 
seems not to share the Horton majority’s understanding of what 
Clarke means.      
Clarke started from the premise that the OTCA’s damages cap did 
not violate article I, section 10, on its face. As Chief Justice Balmer 
stated in his concurring opinion in Clarke: 
“Plaintiff’s challenge to the existing tort claims limit--or to any such 
limit--necessarily would be an ‘as applied’ challenge available only 
to plaintiff (or a similarly situated plaintiff) whose damages actually 
exceeded the limit.  In Jensen v. Whitlow, 334 Or 412, 51 P3d 599 
(2002), this court rejected a facial challenge to the tort claims at 
limit.  Plaintiff does not ask us to overrule Jensen, and the majority 
does not do so.”94 
In Clarke, the court emphasized that “the legislature is authorized 
under article I, section 10, to vary or modify the nature, the form, or 
the amount of recovery for a common-law remedy.”95 In Justice 
Balmer’s concurrence, he observed that “[n]o Oregon case supports 
plaintiff’s position that any tort claims limit would be unconstitutional 
when applied to a plaintiff whose damages exceeded that limit.”96 
Thus, the focus in Clarke was on whether the capped damages were 
“substantial” (and therefore sufficient under article I, section 10) or 
only an “emasculated version of the remedy that was available at 
common law” (and therefore unconstitutionally insufficient).97 
 But in Justice Walters’ Horton dissent, she expressed 
disagreement with the majority’s view of Clarke, Hale, and article I, 
section 10. First, she characterized Clarke as having unanimously 
interpreted Hale, as upholding the OTCA’s damages cap because the 
statute then in effect “did not limit a plaintiff’s right to obtain a fully 
compensatory award from municipal employees.”98 Chief Justice 
Balmer and Justice Kistler expressly rejected that interpretation of 
Hale in their Clarke concurrence, commenting, 
 Plaintiff asserts that Hale is distinguishable because that case, 
unlike this one, did not involve a claim against individual 
defendants that the legislature had eliminated. Although Justice 
 
93 Id. at 288, 376 P.3d at 1064 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
94 Id. 343 Or 581, 614 n. 2 (Balmer, CJ, concurring). 
95 Clarke, 343 Or. at 434. 
96 Clarke, 343 Or. at 614 (Balmer, C.J., concurring). 
97 Clarke, 343 Or at 606. 
98 Horton, at 291, 376 P.3d at 1066 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
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Linde relied upon that fact in his concurring opinion, it played no 
role in the majority’s analysis. Rather, the majority in Hale viewed 
the statutory scheme there as adjusting the liability of public 
defendants by making the city liable for torts committed in its 
governmental capacity that it would not have been liable for at 
common law.99 
In Justice Walters’ Horton dissent, she sharply criticized the 
Horton majority’s suggestion that the legislature may properly effect 
a quid pro quo, based on the majority’s reason of Hale, by 
“extend[ing] an assurance of benefits to some while limiting benefits 
to others.”100 Justice Walters wrote, “[t]his court has never held, in 
this or any other context, that the legislature may bargain away an 
individual constitutional right for something of benefit to others, and 
the majority jeopardizes all individual rights by starting down that 
path.”101 
As for the proposition that damages caps have a salutary effect on 
premiums, enabling more defendants to carry liability insurance, and 
thereby enhancing judgment creditors’ ability to collect their 
judgments, Justice Walters commented that “a plaintiff’s ability to 
collect a judgment is not a benefit of constitutional dimension and can 
have no place in the court’s constitutional analysis.”102 
Finally, Justice Walters seems to have acknowledged that article I, 
section 10, does not guarantee a right to recover unlimited damages, 
but she expressed doubt that any cap on all damages, such as the tort 
claims cap in Clarke, can ever be constitutional. She commented: 
[T]he majority’s post hoc weighing is not the only way to give 
effect to the proposition that Article I, section 10, does not 
guarantee a perfect remedy.  In Clarke, the court recognized that, 
although Article I, section 10, places limits on legislative authority, 
it also permits the exercise of that authority within constitutional 
bounds.  If the legislature were to provide for a restorative, although 
imperfect, remedy in a way that would be equally restorative to all 
injured persons, it is possible that its exercise of authority would be 
upheld. But a monetary cap on damages does not have the same 
restorative effect for all persons regardless of the degree of injury, 
and it therefore does not meet the dictates of Article I, section 10, in 
instances in which it permits some a perfect remedy and others a 
pittance.103 
 
99 Clarke, at 615, 175 P.3d at 437 (citations omitted) (Balmer, C.J., concurring). 
100 Horton, 359 Or. at 291, 376 P.3d at 1066 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
101 Id. 
102 Id. at 293, 376 P.3d at 1067 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
103 Id. at 295–96, 376 P.3d at 1069 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
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To the extent that Justice Walters believes that article I, section 10, 
does not guarantee “a perfect remedy,” one can infer that she 
continues to subscribe to the principle expressed in Clarke that “the 
legislature is authorized under Article I, section 10, to vary or modify 
the nature, the form, or the amount of recovery for a common-law 
remedy.”104 But how much and in what ways the legislature may do 
so remains to be clarified. 
V 
 THE JURY TRIAL PROVISIONS ACCORDING TO THE HORTON 
MAJORITY 
Like the task of interpreting the remedy clause, the job of 
interpreting the Oregon Constitution’s provisions on the right to jury 
trial raises big questions, including these: Do the jury trial provisions 
guarantee the right to have certain types of cases tried to a jury in 
accordance with the laws, including damages caps, then in effect, or 
do they ensure a right to a judgment for the full amount of such 
damages as the jury may award? Does it matter whether a court that 
reduces a jury verdict does so through the exercise of its own 
judgment that the award is excessive, or instead simply enforces a 
statutory limit on damages? 
In grappling with the right to jury trial provisions, the Horton 
majority first analyzed the text of article I, section 17, which 
provides: “In all civil cases the right of Trial by Jury shall remain 
inviolate.”105 The court concluded that the words “remain inviolate” 
suggest that the framers intended to preserve the “right of Trial by 
Jury” as it existed in 1857.106 The court also stated that the use of the 
phrase “by Jury” “suggests that the right that Article I, section 17, 
preserves is a right to a procedure (a trial by a jury as opposed to a 
trial by a judge) rather than a substantive result.”107 However, the 
court concluded that the text, standing alone, does not definitively 
answer the question of what that right encompasses.108 
The court then analyzed the history surrounding the adoption of 
article I, section 17, and concluded that the relevant history “comes 
 
104 Clarke, 343 Or. at 609, 175 P.3d at 434. 
105 Horton, 359 Or. at 226, 376 P.3d at 1031. 
106 Id. at 234, 376 P.3d at 1036. 
107 Id. at 235, 376 P.3d at 1036. 
108 Id. 
MARMADUKE (DO NOT DELETE) 3/29/2018  1:02 PM 
580 OREGON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 96, 561 
primarily from the English practice reflected in Blackstone’s 
Commentaries and the history leading up to and surrounding the 
adoption of the Seventh Amendment” of the United States 
Constitution.109 The court concluded that article I, section 17, 
guarantees only a right to a certain procedure, namely, the right to 
have facts decided by a jury, rather than by a judge.110 The court 
stated, “the history does not suggest that Article I, section 17, limits 
the legislature’s authority to define, as a matter of law, the substantive 
elements of a cause of action or the extent to which damages will be 
available in that action.”111 
After wrestling with the doctrine of stare decisis (an aspect of 
Horton deserving of its own discussion),112 the majority overruled 
Lakin v. Senco Products, Inc.,113 which held that application of the 
OTCA’s cap on damages to the jury’s award violated article I, section 
17.114 
The court then considered article VII (amended), section 3, an 
initiated amendment that provides, in part: 
 In actions at law, where the value in controversy shall exceed 
$750, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact tried 
by a jury shall be otherwise re-examined in any court of this state, 
unless the court can affirmatively say there is no evidence to 
support the verdict.115 
The plaintiff in Horton did not argue that “the right of trial by jury 
shall be preserved” adds anything to article I, section 17.116 Thus, the 
court focused on the provision that “no fact shall be otherwise re-
examined in any court of this state, unless the court can affirmatively 
say that there is no evidence to support the verdict.”117 The majority 
concluded that the provision is directed to the courts, and not to the 
legislature. The court concluded that: 
[textually, article VII (amended), section 3,] places no restriction on 
the legislature’s ability to limit, as a matter of law, the issues before 
the jury or the extent of the damages available for a cause of action. 
 
109 Id. at 243, 376 P.3d at 1040. 
110 Id. 
111 Id. 
112 Id. at 225–34, 359 P.3d at 1031–35. 
113 Lakin v. Senco Prods., Inc., 329 Or. 62, 987 P.2d 463 modified, 329 Or. 369, 987 
P.2d 476 (1999), overruled by Horton, 359 Or. at 250, 376 P.3d at 1044 (2016). 
114 Horton, 359 Or. at 249–50, 376 P.3d at 1044. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. at 251, 376 P.3d at 1045. 
117 Id. 
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Similarly, it does not limit a court’s ability to set aside a jury’s 
verdict that is inconsistent with the substantive law.118 
The majority concluded that the history of the provision is 
consistent with the interpretation that the provision limits only the 
trial court’s authority to second-guess a jury’s fact findings, and does 
not limit the legislature’s authority to establish the substantive law, 
including defining the elements of a cause of action or the type and 
extent of available damages.119 The court concluded that to reduce the 
jury’s verdict of economic damages of $6,072,190.38 and 
noneconomic damages of $6,000,000 to a total of $3,000,000 in 
accordance with the OTCA does not violate either article I, section 
17, or article VII (amended), section 3, of the Oregon Constitution.120 
VI 
 THE JURY TRIAL PROVISIONS ACCORDING TO THE HORTON DISSENT 
The dissent agreed that article I, section 17, does not prohibit the 
legislature from limiting the types of recoverable damages. “Subject 
to constitutional limits other than Article I, section 17, both the court 
and the legislature have authority to define the elements of a tort 
claim and to determine the types of damages that are recoverable.”121 
The dissent acknowledged that “the right that Article I, section 17, 
grants is . . . not a right to a particular common-law claim or to 
unlimited damages.”122 
The dissent also agreed that the purpose of article VII (amended), 
section 3, is “to eliminate, as an incident of a jury trial in this state, 
the common-law power of a trial court to re-examine the evidence 
and set aside a verdict because it was excessive or in any other respect 
opposed to the weight of the evidence.”123 
But the dissent and the majority did not agree on what that means. 
Under the Horton majority’s view, the constitutional infirmity lies not 
in the act of reducing or setting aside a verdict, but in the court’s 
exercise of its subjective judgment in doing so.124 As the majority 
observed, the constitutional guarantees of the right to jury trial have 
 
118 Id. at 252, 376 P.3d at 1045. 
119 Id. at 253–54, 376 P.3d at 1045–46. 
120 See id., 376 P.3d at 1046. 
121 Id. at 297, 376 P.3d at 1070 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
122 Id. at 306, 376 P.3d at 1074 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
123 Id. at 298, 376 P.3d at 1070 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
124 See id. at 251–53, 376 P.3d at 1045–46. 
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their origins, at least in part, in the concerns regarding class bias.125 
The majority quoted Blackstone, who wrote, if factual determinations 
were entrusted to judges, “a select body of men [chosen by the prince] 
. . . will have frequently an involuntary biass [sic] towards those of 
their own rank and dignity.”126 The risk of class bias by the judiciary 
is not in play when judges simply enforce a statutory damages cap 
established by the legislature, any more than when judges treat the 
amount of the prayer as a cap on damages and reduce any verdict that 
exceeds that sum, or when judges reduce the verdict to eliminate a 
category of damages that is unsupported by any evidence. 
The dissent, in contrast, views judicial enforcement of a statutory 
cap on damages as “nothing more than an arbitrary decision that, 
although a plaintiff has sustained damages measured according to 
existing legal principles in an amount assessed by the jury, those 
damages are excessive and must be reduced.”127 Like the majority, 
the dissent alluded to the role of the jury as a safeguard against class 
bias, stating “[t]he procedural right to jury trial guarantees that plain 
people will decide the facts of a case.”128 But, rather than viewing 
civil jury trials as a check on class bias by constraining the authority 
of the judiciary, as the majority suggested, the dissent seemed to view 
civil jury trials as a check on the authority of the legislature, intended 
to “preclude[] the legislature from interfering with [a] verdict [that] 
was entered in accordance with existing common law.”129 In support 
of its position, the dissent referenced decisions in other jurisdictions 
with approval, stating, 
 Courts in other jurisdictions . . . have held that, although a state 
legislature has authority to make or amend the common law, the 
constitutional right to jury trial precludes the legislature from 
interfering with a jury’s fact-finding role by reducing a jury’s 
factual determination of damages to a predetermined amount.130 
In the dissent’s view, article III (amended), section 7, precludes a 
court from reducing a verdict by enforcing the legislature’s decision 
as the amount and type of damages recoverable for certain claims, 
 
125 See id. at 238–39, 376 P.3d at 1038. 
126 Id. at 237, 376 P.3d at 1037 (alteration in original) (quoting 3 WILLIAM 
BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 379 (Oxford 1768)). 
127 Id. at 299, 376 P.3d at 1070 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
128 See id. at 306, 376 P.3d at 1074 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
129 See id. at 298, 376 P.3d at 1070 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
130 Id. at 299, 376 P.3d at 1070–71 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
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even though that action requires no subjective assessment by the court 
of the appropriateness of the verdict. 
CONCLUSION 
The Horton opinion is rich with history and thoughtful analysis. It 
is a thorough and scholarly effort to synthesize what is ultimately an 
irreconcilable line of remedy clause cases. The court laid the 
groundwork for the next step, which this writer hopes will lead to an 
approach to the remedy clause that gives greater deference to the 
policy making role of the legislature. As long as the court continues to 
adopt a decision-making model that empowers each judge to decide 
such amorphous and subjective questions as whether a challenged 
statute effectuates a sufficiently important trade-off, whether the 
interests protected by common law causes of action are truly “core” 
interests anymore, and whether the damages allowed by the 
challenged statute are sufficiently “substantial,” the scope and effect 
of Oregon’s remedy clause will remain unpredictable by litigants and 
by the lower courts.  
Justice Walters commented in her discussion of the right to jury 
trial provisions, “The rule of stare decisis is essential to the public’s 
confidence that the law is more than a reflection of personal 
preference, and the public’s confidence in the law is the fragile 
foundation on which our system of justice rests.”131 But stare decisis 
does not fulfill that goal when the precedents lack standards capable 
of yielding predictable results, independent of judges’ personal 
preferences. Justice Landau’s interpretation of the remedy clause as 
protecting against interference with judicial independence and access 
to the courts, but not limiting the legislature’s authority to determine 
substantive rights,132 would solve that problem. A return to that 
approach, as in Perozzi (holding that article I, section 10, does not 
deny the legislature authority to adjust the duties that one person owes 
another) and Sealey (recognizing the legislature’s authority to 
determine what constitutes a legally cognizable injury), would restore 
the legislative and judicial branches to their proper roles. 
As for article I, section 17, and article VII (amended), section 3, 
the Horton court has opened a new, but almost certainly not the last, 
chapter in our understanding of the Oregon Constitution’s protections 
 
131 Id. at 303, 376 P.3d at 1073 (Walters, J., dissenting). 
    132 Id. at 286, 376 P.3d at 1064 (Landau, J., concurring). 
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of the right to jury trial. It is now well established that the jury trial 
provisions prohibit judges from “putting a judicial thumb on the 
scales of justice” by reducing a jury’s award of economic and 
noneconomic damages simply because the judge views the award, 
according to the judge’s subjective evaluation, as excessive. One of 
the primary functions of judges is to apply the laws that the legislature 
has enacted. But the dissent seems to view the jury trial provisions as 
prohibiting judges from performing that function when the law in 
question limits recoverable damages. Whether Justice Walters will be 
able to persuade a majority of that view remains to be seen. The 
meaning and effect of the jury trial provisions will undoubtedly be a 
subject of future opinions. 
 
